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Abstract 
 
Seasonal migration programs are widely used around the world, and are increasingly seen as 
offering a potential “triple-win”- benefiting the migrant, sending country, and receiving 
country. Yet there is a dearth of rigorous evidence as to their development impact, and 
concerns about whether the time periods involved are too short to realize much in the way of 
benefits, and whether poorer, less skilled households actually get to participate in such 
programs. We study the development impacts of a recently introduced seasonal worker 
program which has been deemed to be “best practice”. New Zealand’s Recognised Seasonal 
Employer (RSE) program was launched in 2007 with an explicit focus on development in the 
Pacific alongside the aim of benefiting employers at home. A multi-year prospective 
evaluation allows us to measure the impact of participation in this program on households 
and communities in Tonga and Vanuatu. Using a matched difference-in-differences analysis 
based on detailed surveys fielded before, during, and after participation, we find that the RSE 
has indeed had largely positive development impacts. It has increased income and 
consumption of households, allowed households to purchase more durable goods, increased 
subjective standard of living, and had additional benefits at the community level. It also 
increased child schooling in Tonga. This should rank it among the most effective 
development policies evaluated to date. The policy was designed as a best practice example 
based on lessons elsewhere, and now should serve as a model for other countries to follow. 
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First and foremost it will help alleviate poverty directly by providing jobs for rural and outer island 
workers who often lack income-generating work. The earnings they send home will support families, 
help pay for education and health, and sometimes provide capital for those wanting to start a small 
business. (Winston Peters, New Zealand Minister of Foreign Affairs, at the approval of the RSE 
program, October 2006.1) 
 
A guest worker program is the most effective contribution we can make to improving the lives of the 
world’s working poor.  (Dani Rodrik in a New York Times op-Ed, June 1, 2007.) 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
International migration is probably the most effective mechanism we know to rapidly 
increase the incomes of poor people (Clemens et al., 2008). However, it is also one of the 
most controversial, with migrant-receiving countries worried about the costs of assimilating 
workers and their families. Temporary or circular migration programs are seen as a way of 
overcoming such concerns and enabling poorer, less-skilled workers to benefit from the 
higher incomes to be earned abroad as part of a “triple-win”, whereby migrants, the sending 
country, and the receiving country all benefit. Such programs have been recommended as one 
of the most promising ways to enhance the development benefits of migration by a wide 
range of international organizations (UN, 2004; GCIM, 2005; World Bank 2006), national 
Governments (House of Commons International Development Committee, 2004) and 
academics (Winters et al., 2003; Pritchett, 2006, Rodrik, 2007). 
 
 Almost all OECD countries have temporary worker migration programs, with seasonal 
workers the largest single category, totaling 576,000 workers in 2006 (OECD, 2008).  
However, such programs remain controversial. This is particularly true of programs geared to 
low-skilled migrants, such as seasonal migration programs, as witnessed by the policy debate 
in the United States over a new guest worker program and continued debate in Western 
Europe about the role of seasonal workers.  Some critics of such programs raise concerns that 
workers will over-stay and/or compete down the wages of native poorer workers (e.g. Borjas, 
2007), while others raise concerns about the possible exploitation of workers and whether 
workers can earn enough to make it worthwhile if the duration of work is short.2 
 
 Lacking from this debate is credible evidence as to what the development impact is of 
international seasonal worker programs. The few existing studies are based on ex-post 
surveys of migrants, and lack credible counterfactuals of what would have happened to 
households in the absence of migration. For example, Basok (2000) conducted a snowball 
sample of Mexican workers in Canada’s seasonal worker program in one area of Canada and 
                                                 
1  Quoted in “Seasonal work policy benefits Pacific says Peters”, Islands Business, October 26, 2006. 
http://www.islandsbusiness.com/news/index_dynamic/containerNameToReplace=MiddleMiddle/f
ocusModuleID=130/focusContentID=6691/tableName=mediaRelease/overideSkinName=newsArt
icle-full.tpl (accessed August 11, 2010). 
 
2  These concerns are discussed in Ruhs (2006), Pritchett (2006) and OECD (2008) among others. 
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in one village in Mexico and asked them what they had spent their money earned on, finding 
that many said they had built houses and paid for schooling. Macours and Vakis (2010) look 
at the impact of seasonal migration on early childhood development, using a cross-sectional 
survey of Nicaraguan households near the border with Honduras, where half of the seasonal 
workers migrate to Honduras or neighboring Central American countries. They attempt to 
identify the impact of seasonal migration by using wage, price, and adult illness shocks 
experienced by the households as instruments, and find seasonal migration by mothers to 
reduce stunting and improve cognitive development in young children. However, these 
instruments seem likely to fail the exclusion restriction: as they acknowledge, the shocks 
could directly affect early childhood outcomes through other channels such as nutrition. 
 
 This paper seeks to provide credible evidence on the development impact of seasonal 
migration by means of a prospective multi-year evaluation of New Zealand’s Recognised 
Seasonal Employer (RSE) scheme. The RSE began in 2007 and aims to ease labor shortages 
in New Zealand’s horticulture and viticulture industries and at the same time aid economic 
development in the Pacific Islands. The policy was developed taking account of lessons from 
previous seasonal worker programs elsewhere and is viewed as a possible model for other 
countries. For example, the ILO good practices database states “The comprehensive approach 
of the RSE scheme towards filling labour shortages in the horticulture and viticulture 
industries in New Zealand and the system of checks to ensure that the migration process is 
orderly, fair, and circular could service as a model for other destination countries.”3  
 
 Our evaluation was designed prospectively, alongside the launch of the program. Thanks 
to the World Bank’s strong support for this policy and close collaboration with the 
Governments of New Zealand, Tonga, and Vanuatu, we were able to conduct baseline 
surveys of households and communities in Tonga and Vanuatu before workers left to work in 
New Zealand, and then re-interview these same households 6, 12 and 24 months later. Using 
this rich baseline data and institutional knowledge of how recruitment for the program 
occurred, we use propensity-score matching to identify an appropriate set of households to 
act as a comparison group for the households participating in the RSE, and then use panel 
difference-in-differences and fixed effects estimation to assess the impacts of the RSE on 
household incomes, consumption, durable assets and subjective well-being, and additionally 
measure broader community-level impacts. 
 
 The results show that the RSE has had large positive effects on sending households in 
Tonga and Vanuatu. We find per capita incomes of households participating in the RSE to 
have increased by over 30 percent relative to the comparison groups in both countries, with 
per-capita expenditure also increasing, although by less than income. Subjective economic 
welfare is estimated to have increased by almost half a standard deviation in both countries, 
                                                 
3  http://www.ilo.org/dyn/migpractice/migmain.showPractice?p_lang=en&p_practice_id=48 
[accessed August 11, 2010] 
5 
 
and households have purchased more durable assets such as DVD players, radios, ovens, and 
in Vanuatu, boats. In Tonga RSE households also doubled the rate of home improvement, 
and in both countries, households became more likely to have a bank account, likely 
reflecting more formal savings. School attendance rates increased by 20 percentage points for 
16 to 18 year olds in Tonga, and community-level effects were generally modest, but 
positive. Overall these results show that the seasonal worker program has been a powerful 
development intervention for the participating households, and that the RSE policy appears to 
have succeeded in its development objectives in the short run. 
 
 The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a description of 
the RSE policy and how workers were recruited. Section 3 describes our surveys and 
estimation methodology. Household-level impacts are estimated in Section 4, and impacts at 
the community level are discussed in Section 5. Section 6 concludes. 
 
 
2. The RSE policy 
 
The RSE policy was launched on 30 April 2007. It initially allowed up to 5,000 seasonal 
workers to come to New Zealand for a maximum of seven months per 11 month period to 
work in the horticulture and viticulture industries.4  Preference is given to workers from 
Pacific Island Forum countries (except Fiji), with Kiribati, Samoa, Tonga, Tuvalu, and 
Vanuatu selected for special “kick-start” status which entailed deliberate and expedited 
efforts to launch the scheme and recruit in these countries. Vanuatu and Tonga, the focus of 
our impact analysis, supplied the most workers under the RSE in the first two seasons: 3590 
workers in the case of Vanuatu and 1971 from Tonga (including return workers). 
 
 Ramasamy et al. (2008) detail the origins of the policy and the Government thinking 
behind its creation. The RSE was seen as a way to solve the long-standing problems the 
horticulture and viticulture industries had in meeting their seasonal labor needs and boost the 
economic growth and productivity of this sector, while contributing to New Zealand’s broad 
development objectives in the Pacific region. Design of the RSE paid careful attention to 
previous experience with seasonal worker programs around the world, and the resulting 
policy contains many of the features that are believed to be best practice for ensuring success 
of seasonal worker schemes and to mitigate the risks of overstaying, displacement of New 
Zealand workers, and worker exploitation.  
 
 The risk of overstaying is mitigated in a number of ways: workers may be re-employed 
in subsequent years, either with the same or a new employer, which can be contrasted with 
single-entry schemes which provide high incentives for workers to overstay; employers are 
required to pay the costs associated with worker removal from New Zealand if workers 
                                                 
4  The cap was raised from 5,000 to 8,000 workers in October 2008. Workers from Kiribati and 
Tuvalu are permitted to stay for up to 9 months instead of 7, each 11 month period. 
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become illegal, giving employers incentives to choose workers who they believe will return, 
and to not be complicit in their overstaying; and competition for places among communities 
and countries leads to social pressures to not jeopardize future possibilities for others by 
overstaying and thereby creating a negative reputation for one’s community.  
 
 The risk of displacement of New Zealand workers is mitigated through a “New 
Zealanders first” principle of the policy, which requires employers to first lodge their 
vacancies with the Ministry of Social Development (who provide welfare benefits and job 
search services) before attempting to recruit offshore. The RSE places special emphasis on 
“pastoral care”, with employers required to arrange suitable accommodation, internal 
transportation, access to personal banking services, provision of protective equipment and 
opportunities for recreation and religious observance. The risk of exploitation is mitigated 
through regulations stating that workers must not be charged recruitment fees and that 
employers must pay market wages and offer workers at least a minimum remuneration which 
depends on the length of the contract. 
 
 Inter-agency understandings between the New Zealand Department of Labour and the 
respective labor ministry in each kick-start country set out the recruitment options in each 
country. In Tonga employers wishing to hire workers could either recruit the workers 
directly, or recruit from a “work-ready” pool of Tongan nationals pre-screened and selected 
by the ministry. In the first year recruitment from the work-ready pool was the dominant 
employment mode. The work-ready pool was established by pre-selection and screening at 
the district level by district and town officers, together with church and community leaders. 
The tremendous interest in the scheme was seen in more than 5,000 Tongans having 
registered for the work-ready pool within 3 months of the launch of the scheme. In Gibson et 
al. (2008) we explore in detail this selection process, and find that the main attributes used by 
village committees in pre-selection were looking for honest, responsible, hard-working 
people who spoke reasonable English, didn’t drink alcohol excessively, and who were from 
low-income families. Employers recruiting from this pool would then conduct interviews of 
the short-listed workers to decide who to take. The Tongan Labour Ministry was very 
conscious to try and ensure that as many villages as possible were given the opportunity to 
participate, and all villages had workers in the scheme.  
 
 In Vanuatu employers could either hire directly or through an agent. Direct recruitment is 
facilitated by the Vanuatu Department of Labour, which in the first year also used a work-
ready pool of workers from walk-ins who registered directly with the department. These 
workers were typically from the more urban areas. In rural areas, direct recruitment and 
agents relied heavily on community contacts through village councils, again using villages to 
pre-screen workers. In McKenzie et al. (2008) we study this process, and find that, similar to 
Tonga, agents and villages looked for people who were strong, hardworking, obedient, 
healthy, spoke English and were not alcoholics. Perhaps due to the newness of international 
migration in Vanuatu, it was not the poorest households who applied and had workers 
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selected for the program, with communities more concerned with sending workers who 
would represent the village well, and the poorest households not necessarily having 
information about the program in the first year, or having the resources to finance the costs of 
the travel process.5   
 
 Typical work under the RSE includes working on vineyards to prune vines and pick 
grapes, harvesting apples and kiwifruit and other fruitpicking, and working in the packhouse 
to sort, grade, and pack the fruit. The work was typically physically demanding, and included 
work in both cold and hot conditions. In part due to the nature of the work, the majority of 
RSE workers recruited were male: in the first year in our sample, 82 percent of the ni-
Vanuatu RSE workers and 87 percent of the Tongan RSE workers were male. This 
corresponds closely to the gender-mix in the population of RSE workers from these countries 
in the first year – official data on all workers from Tonga and Vanuatu recruited by 22 May 
2008 show that males comprised 78 percent of the ni-Vanuatu and 91 percent of the Tongans 
recruited by that date (effectively the first season).6 
 
 The RSE has been viewed as a success from the New Zealand point of view. An 
evaluation of the first two years conducted by the New Zealand Department of Labour (2010, 
p.xvii) concluded that “Overall, the RSE Policy has achieved what it set out to do” The policy 
is found to have provided employers in the horticulture and viticulture industries with access 
to a reliable and stable workforce, with productivity gains starting to emerge as workers 
return for another season. The main concerns raised about temporary labor programs have 
been mitigated: the evaluation finds little displacement of New Zealand workers; almost all 
workers have returned, with overstay rates of about 1 percent in the first season and less than 
1 percent in the second; and concerns about worker exploitation have at most arisen in a 
couple of isolated cases. The question this paper addresses is then whether the RSE has also 
lived up to the policy goal of improving development in the Pacific. 
 
 
3. Our surveys and estimation methodology 
 
3.1 The surveys 
 
There was keen interest from national Governments on both sides of the migration 
relationship and from the World Bank in learning whether the new RSE policy would have 
the development impacts envisioned as one of the core rationales for the program. It was 
therefore decided ex ante that there should be a rigorous evaluation of the development 
impacts of the program. We decided on Tonga and Vanuatu as the focus of our evaluation, 
since it was expected that they would be the countries that participated most, and they offer 
                                                 
5  Employers are required to cover half the cost of the return airfare, and often provide loans to 
workers for the worker share. But workers still had to meet the costs of a passport, visa, police 
clearance, medical check-up, and local transport to and from their home to the airport. 
 
6  Official data provided as a custom table by the New Zealand Department of Labour. 
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an interesting contrast in previous migration history with New Zealand.7 Tonga (population 
100,000) has traditionally had high emigration rates to New Zealand, Australia and the 
United States, with most recent migration through family-sponsored categories and a special 
annual permanent migration quota to New Zealand called the Pacific Access Category. The 
2006 New Zealand Census enumerated 20,520 Tongan-born in New Zealand.8 In contrast to 
Tonga, Vanuatu (population 215,000) has had relatively little international emigration, with 
only 1.5 percent of its population abroad prior to the RSE (World Bank, 2008), and fewer 
than 1,000 Vanuatu-born in the 2006 New Zealand Census. 
 
 Given that recruiting of workers occurred at the employer level, the interests of 
employers in screening workers themselves, and the large number of employers involved, it 
was never going to be feasible to attempt to get employers to randomly select workers. 
Therefore we decided the most credible impact evaluation strategy would be a matched 
difference-in-differences approach. This would entail conducting a baseline survey of 
households which would participate in the RSE before the workers left, along with surveys of 
non-participating households, and then following these households over time. Non-
participating households would be separated into whether or not they had a member of the 
work-ready pool who had applied for the program, but not been selected. 
 
 The RSE contains no country-specific quotas, so ex ante it was not known how many 
individuals from each country would participate in the scheme. However, the numbers likely 
to be involved were certainly too small for a simple random sample of households to pick up 
enough RSE households in a cost-effective way – at most 5% of households would be likely 
to participate in the program. This meant we needed to know RSE status before surveying. 
Survey design was then complicated by the fact that approvals to recruit workers and 
recruitment took place on a rolling basis. For example, the first employer to recruit workers 
under the RSE initially contracted 20 Tongans workers in July 2007, the next employer in 
Tonga contracted 6 workers in August, and the next 35 in September. In Vanuatu, a grower 
co-operative (Seasonal Solutions) contracted 232 workers in one go, with smaller employers 
also recruiting at staggered intervals. Once workers were selected for recruitment, there was 
often only two or three weeks before they left for New Zealand, which left a very short 
window of time to interview them and their household for baseline, or to at least interview 
their household within a week or two of their departure (with the worker intercepted upon 
arrival in New Zealand and interviewed separately from their household). 
 
                                                 
7  Tuvalu and Kiribati both had fewer than 100 workers per season participate in the RSE, offering 
insufficient sample size for rigorous impact assessment. Samoa was the other main kick-start 
country. A one-off ex-post survey of households was conducted there. 
 
8  http://www.stats.govt.nz/Census/2006CensusHomePage/QuickStats/quickstats-about-a-
subject/culture-and-identity.aspx  (accessed August 13, 2010). 
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 Given these conditions, we used a rolling sampling methodology, adding sample as we 
received updates of when, where, and who employers were recruiting. In both countries the 
baseline survey was conducted between October 2007 and April 2008. In Tonga our survey 
has near national coverage, covering the islands of Tongatapu, Vava’u and ‘Eua. These three 
islands contain 90 percent of the population and 92 percent of the RSE workers in the first 
year. We worked closely with the Tongan Labour Ministry to identify villages supplying 
workers, and within those the village town officers identified households with RSE workers 
and households with members of the RSE work-ready pool who had not been selected yet. 
We additionally surveyed randomly selected households in the same villages where no one 
had applied for the program. In each village we aimed for approximately five households 
with an RSE worker, three households with a member of the work-ready pool who was not 
selected, and four households with non-applicants. Our resulting baseline survey covered 448 
households containing 2,335 individuals in 46 villages.9 
 
 Vanuatu’s rugged geography and high transportation costs meant it was not feasible to 
survey in all islands, so a decision was made to limit the evaluation to three islands from 
which we believed there was a high ex ante chance of workers coming. These islands were 
Efate (population 50,000), where the capital city, Port Vila, is located; and Ambrym 
(population 10,000) and Tanna (population 20,000). These latter two islands were chosen due 
to Seasonal Solutions hiring from these islands. In contrast to Tonga, not all villages in 
Vanuatu were initially participating in the RSE, and in addition to sampling non-applicant 
households from within villages with participating RSE workers, we also sampled households 
from nearby villages or communities which had not participated in the RSE. Ultimately our 
baseline survey covered 456 households containing 2,173 individuals in 48 villages or 
communities. 
 
 Three rounds of follow-up surveys were then conducted. The first took place between 
April and July 2008, approximately six months after the baseline survey. This was intended 
to be a time when RSE workers were still in the midst of their 7 month stint abroad. 
However, as in practice many contracts were for shorter than 7 months (to be discussed 
below), approximately two-thirds of Tongan RSE workers and one-fifth of ni-Vanuatu RSE 
workers in our sample had returned by the time of this survey. The second follow-up survey 
took place between October 2008 and February 2009, approximately one year after the 
baseline, while the third and final follow-up survey took place between October 2009 and 
March 2010, two years after baseline. 
 
 Attrition was remarkably low in the Tongan sample. Of the 448 households in the 
baseline, we were able to re-interview 442 households in the second round survey, 444 in the 
third round, and 440 in the fourth round. In contrast, attrition was higher in Vanuatu. Of the 
                                                 
9  Further details of the baseline sampling methodology for Tonga are contained in Gibson et al. 
(2008), while McKenzie et al. (2008) provides more details on the Vanuatu sampling 
methodology. 
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456 households in the baseline survey, 382, 388, and 348 households were re-interviewed in 
rounds 2, 3 and 4 respectively, whilst 33 households were only interviewed in round 1. The 
higher attrition rates arose from i) internal mobility, with a few households moving to other 
islands within Vanuatu that were not part of the three where we were surveying; ii) cases 
where the RSE worker died and the rest of the household moved; iii) respondent fatigue, with 
some of the non-RSE households complaining that their lives had not changed at all, so why 
were we asking the same questions over again; and iv) 8 cases where husbands or wives 
divorced while the other was away in New Zealand, and the worker refused to answer. In an 
appendix we show our main results are robust to this attrition. 
 
3.2 Estimation methodology 
 
We consider two measures of a household’s participation in the RSE. The first is a binary 
indicator RSEi,t of whether household i has at least one member who has worked in the RSE 
by time t, where t=1,2,3 and 4 corresponds to our four survey waves. This variable takes 
value zero in the baseline for all households, and then switches on once a household 
participates in the RSE. Estimating the impact of RSEi,t then involves estimating the average 
impact of ever participating in the RSE over the first two years of the program. 
 
 However households varied substantially in the degree of their exposure to the RSE. This 
variation in the intensity of RSE participation arose from i) differences in the duration of a 
contract, with contract durations varying between three and seven months, and a small 
number of workers returning after only one or two months before their contract had ended; ii) 
differences in whether workers returned for a second or even third contract during our survey 
period; and iii) a handful of households having more than one worker participate in the 
RSE. 10  We therefore define a second measure of household RSE participation, 
RSEDurationi,t, as the cumulative number of months workers from household i have spent in 
New Zealand by time period t. Among the RSE households in our Tongan sample, the mean 
(median) cumulative duration in New Zealand by the time of our fourth round survey was 7.8 
months (6 months), with a 10th percentile of 3 months and 90th percentile of 14 months. For 
RSE households in Vanuatu, the mean (median) at the time of the fourth round survey was 
8.4 months (7 months), with a 10th percentile of 4 months and 90th percentile of 14 months. 
58 percent of Tongan RSE households and 54 percent of Vanuatu RSE households had only 
one seasonal worker spell during the two years of our study.  
 
 We then begin with panel data regressions of the impact of the RSE in each country, 
using the full sample of households from each country. Letting Yi,t be an outcome of interest 
                                                 
10 For the RSE as a whole, 23 percent of workers spent 3 months or less in New Zealand, 18 percent 
spent 4 months, 20 percent spent 5 months, 27 percent spent 6 months and 11 percent spent 7 
months (as of August 23, 2009, see Table 5 of New Zealand Department of Labour, 2010). 51 
percent of workers from kick-start states from the first season returned in the second season. 
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for household i in survey round t, we begin with the following difference-in-differences 
specification: 
 
    (1) 
 
where EverRSEi indicates whether household i ever participates in the RSE over the four 
waves of our sample, and δt are survey round dummies. The coefficient of interest is then γ, 
which gives the average treatment effect of participating in the RSE. We do not include 
additional time-varying controls in this regression, since we have few time-varying variables 
that are not potentially themselves affected by the RSE. Standard errors are clustered at the 
household level to account for autocorrelation in the error term εi,t across survey waves. The 
same equation is also estimated using RSEDurationi,t in place of RSEi,t,, in which case γ gives 
the average household-level impact of one month’s duration in the RSE. 
 
 Difference-in-differences controls for any baseline level differences in the outcome Yi,t at 
the group-level. An alternative approach is to control for baseline differences at the 
household-level through the addition of household-level fixed effects. We estimate this via 
the following specification: 
 
       (2) 
 
where μi is the fixed effect for household i. Again we estimate this using both our measures 
of household-level RSE participation, and cluster the standard errors at the household level.  
The underlying assumption in both the difference-in-differences and the fixed effects 
specifications is that after controlling for level differences among households, they would 
have exhibited the same trends in the outcome variables in the absence of the RSE. However, 
this assumption is less credible when the households we are comparing have very different 
characteristics. We therefore follow the recommendations of Crump et al. (2009), who 
recommend estimating a propensity score, and then dropping observations with estimated 
propensity scores outside the range [0.1,0.9]. This ensures the regression is estimated only for 
the sample where the covariate distribution overlaps for the RSE and non-RSE households. 
 
 Our study includes many of the features identified as desirable for propensity-score 
matching (Dehejia, 2005). Our surveys of RSE and non-RSE households were conducted at 
the same time in the same villages (and hence local labor markets) using the same 
questionnaire. We have good knowledge of the characteristics villages and employers were 
looking for in selecting workers and can include these in the matching specification. In 
addition we have more than one period of pre-RSE wage earning data (although only a 
minority of households earned wage income). Furthermore we know whether households 
tried to participate in the RSE (by having a member register for the work-ready pool, or apply 
directly to an employer). Finally, we also have a plausible reason why some households 
participated in the RSE and other households with these same characteristics did not – there 
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was excess demand for RSE employment, and so not all households who wanted to 
participate were able to.  
 
 We estimate two versions of the propensity score, which we denote PS-1 and PS-2. They 
differ only in that PS-2 first restricts the sample to households which applied to participate in 
the RSE before estimating the score, eliminating the non-applicant households. This allows 
us to explicitly screen on demand for the RSE, although given that the reason many non-
applicant households said they didn’t apply was lack of information about the program 
(Gibson et al, 2008; McKenzie et al, 2008), failure to apply need not imply lack of demand.   
 
 We then use six main categories of variables which we believe may influence 
participation in the RSE to estimate the propensity score: demographic variables (household 
size, number of males aged 18 to 50, number of adults, number of school age children); 
characteristics of the 18-50 year old males in the household, who are the individuals most 
likely to participate (share literate in English, share with schooling beyond grade 10, the share 
with self-reported health rated as very good, the share who drank alcohol in the past month, 
and the mean number of days of hard labor carried out in the past month); the household’s 
previous experience and network in New Zealand (share of adults who had previously been to 
New Zealand, number of relatives in New Zealand); household baseline assets and housing 
infrastructure (an asset index comprising the first principal component of durable goods 
owned, the number of pigs, cattle and chickens owned, and whether the dwelling was 
traditional style); geography (on Tongatapu or Efate as opposed to one of the other islands) 
and past household wage and salary history (household wage income for the first half of 2006 
and 2007, and whether the household had any male aged 18 to 50 in each of these periods). 
For each variable we include both the variable and its square in estimating the propensity 
score.  
 
 For Tonga estimating the propensity score and restricting to the range [0.1, 0.9] reduces 
our sample of 448 households (197 RSE, 251 non-RSE) to 372 households using PS-1 (182 
RSE and 190 non-RSE) and 284 households using PS-2 (154 RSE, 121 non-RSE). In 
Vanuatu the sample of 456 households (147 RSE, 309 non-RSE) reduces to 360 households 
using PS-1 (129 RSE, 231 non-RSE) and to 269 households using PS-2 (123 RSE, 146 non-
RSE). The trimmed samples thus mainly trim out non-RSE households which are too 
dissimilar to RSE households to be appropriate comparators, whilst also trimming out a few 
of the RSE households which differ too much from any non-RSE household. 
 
 We then re-estimate (1) and (2) for households with propensity scores in the range [0.1, 
0.9]. Again the differencing or fixed effects will eliminate both observed and unobserved 
time-invariant differences amongst households, and the assumption of a common underlying 
trend in the absence of the RSE is likely to be more credible for households with propensity 
scores within this range.  
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 We use equations (1) and (2) to look at the impact of the RSE on flow variables of 
interest, like income, consumption, and their components. To look at the impacts on stock 
variables like assets owned, we instead estimate, for households within the propensity score 
range [0.1, 0.9], the following equation: 
 
      (3) 
 
 For example, estimating equation (3) for whether the household owns a TV, is equivalent 
to asking whether, conditional on their TV ownership status in the baseline, households 
which participated in the RSE are more likely to own a TV two years later than non-RSE 
households with similar covariates. 
 
 Finally, for the variables subjective well-being, making a dwelling improvement over the 
two years of our study, and making a major asset purchase (200 pa’anga or more in Tonga, 
10,000 vatu or more in Vanuatu) over the two years of our study we estimate equation (3) 
without including the baseline lag. 
 
 
3.3  Measurement and Summary Statistics 
 
 The main outcomes of interest are household income and expenditure, asset ownership, 
and schooling. Household income is measured as the sum of net remittances (remittance 
inflows less remittance outflows, including RSE remittances as an inflow), cash sales of 
agricultural production, the value of food produced for own consumption, wage and salary 
income, other income such as interest or rent income, and repatriated earnings that RSE 
migrants carry back with them instead of remitting while abroad. Household expenditure is 
measured via a 20 category recall module, with reference periods ranging between one week 
and six months depending on the source of expenditure. This is aggregated to the semi-annual 
level and added to the value of food produced for own use to arrive at total expenditure.  
 
 Table 1 presents baseline means of household characteristics for the RSE households, for 
all other households in the sample, and for the PS-1 and PS-2 screened subsamples. Asterisks 
show the results of tests for difference in means. Consider first the Tongan sample. The 
average RSE household has 5.7 members, including 1.5 males aged 18 to 50. The largely 
rural subsistence farming nature of these households is seen in only 21 percent of these 
households having any male wage or salary worker in the household six months prior to the 
launch of the RSE, as well as in the average household owning pigs and chickens. Semi-
annual per capita income and consumption, including the value of goods produced for own 
consumption, averaged 830 pa’anga (approximately US$432).11  This is less than a RSE 
worker could earn in a good week in New Zealand. 
                                                 
11  In April 2008, NZ$1 = 1.52 pa’anga and US$1 = 1.92 pa’anga; NZ$1 = 73.08 vatu, and US$1 = 
92.50 vatu. 
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 Table 1 shows that the Tongan RSE households tend to be larger and poorer than the 
average non-RSE household in our sample. The males in these households worked more days 
of hard labor on average than non-RSE households, reflecting selection of workers more able 
or inclined to do physical work. The RSE households are also more connected to New 
Zealand, with adults in the household more likely to have previously been to New Zealand, 
and the household having more relatives in New Zealand. The third and fourth columns of the 
Table show that matching and restricting to households with propensity-score between 0.1 
and 0.9 makes the RSE and non-RSE households more similar as we drop non-RSE 
households which differ substantially from the RSE households on these variables. The PS-2 
subsample in particular does not differ significantly in baseline demographics, income, or 
consumption from the subsample of RSE households with propensity scores in the [0.1, 0.9] 
range. 
 
 In contrast to Tonga, the RSE households in Vanuatu tend to be richer than the average 
non-RSE household, with higher baseline asset ownership, income and consumption. 
Nevertheless, a large share of those participating are still poor by international standards: 37 
percent of the RSE households have per capita income of below US$2 per day. Again 
matching and restricting to households with propensity-scores between 0.1 and 0.9 makes the 
RSE and non-RSE households more similar. However, in contrast to Tonga, the restriction to 
applicant households in PS-2 does not seem to improve on PS-1. This likely reflects the less 
widespread nature of the work-ready pool in Vanuatu, meaning that some non-applicants may 
be better matches for RSE workers in Vanuatu than we can find amongst our sample of 
applicants. 
 
 Comparing the characteristics of the Tongan and ni-Vanuatu samples shows the much 
greater prior exposure of Tongans to international migration: the average Tongan RSE 
worker in our sample has 5.4 relatives in New Zealand, compared to 0.1 relatives for the 
average ni-Vanuatu RSE worker in our sample. 38 percent of Tongan RSE households have 
an adult in the household who has worked or studied for one month or more in New Zealand 
before, compared to only 8 percent of the ni-Vanuatu RSE households. The higher levels of 
schooling in Tonga are seen in a greater share of adult males in Tonga being literate in 
English, and in 46 percent of males aged 18 to 50 in RSE households having more than 10 
years of schooling in Tonga, compared to only 6 percent in Vanuatu. However, the Vanuatu 
sample is more likely to have previously worked for pay, and in the end, the poverty rates are 
similar for our evaluation samples in both countries. 
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Household-level Impacts 
 
4.1 Impact on Income and Expenditure 
 
Table 2 presents the results of estimating equation (1) in columns 1-4 and equation (2) in 
columns 5-8 for Tonga.12 For each estimation method we begin with the full sample, and then 
show the results for the propensity-score screened samples. Finally to check whether our 
results are being driven by a few observations at the upper tail, columns 4 and 8 trim the top 1 
percent of observations from the sample. Panel A shows the impact of a household ever being 
in the RSE, and Panel B the impact per month of duration in the RSE. 
 
 Participating in the RSE is found to have a large and statistically significant positive 
impact on household income per capita in Tonga. Semi-annual income is estimated to be 233-
249 pa’anga more as a result of the RSE, relative to a baseline income of 979 pa’anga for 
these households. Trimming for potential outliers increases this gain even more, to 300-325 
pa’anga. Log income is less sensitive to outliers, and we also see large and statistically 
significant impacts on log income. Using the estimates which screen on PS-2 and are thus 
restricted to RSE applicants, the estimated increase in log income is 0.29-0.32, corresponding 
to a 34 to 38 percent increase in per capita income as a result of the RSE. The duration results 
also give positive, and statistically significant, impacts of the RSE. Each month of 
participation in the RSE is estimated to increase household per capita income by 20-31 
pa’anga. 
 
 Household expenditure per capita is also found to increase with participation in the RSE 
in Tonga. However, the increase is less than the increase in per capita income, and if we 
restrict ourselves to the PS-2 screened sample, is only significant after trimming outliers. The 
log per capita consumption results suggest the increase in expenditure is approximately 9-10 
percent, which is only a third of the increase in per capita income. This is consistent with 
some of the additional income being saved, or being spent on items that are not asked or not 
recalled well in our expenditure recall module. 
 
 Table 3 considers the same impacts for Vanuatu. The difference-in-differences results 
show large and statistically significant impacts of participating in the RSE on per capita 
income and expenditure. Semi-annual income is estimated to be approximately 44,000 vatu 
higher, relative to a baseline of 85,000 vatu. In log terms, per capita income is 0.30 to 0.36 
log points higher, which is equivalent to a 35 to 43 percentage increase. Semi-annual per 
capita expenditure is approximately 12,000-13,000 vatu higher, relative to a baseline of 
                                                 
12  Note that we are assessing the impacts on income and expenditure of household members in Tonga 
and Vanuatu. The seasonal worker is counted as part of the household for periods when he or she 
is in the home country, but they are not included when they are in New Zealand. To the extent that 
migrants are earning and consuming more than the average remaining household member whilst 
they are abroad, we are therefore underestimating the average impact on individuals originally 
present in the household, even though we get the average impact for individuals present in the 
household in the sending countries. 
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65,000 vatu, and the effect on log expenditure is equivalent to approximately a 28 percent 
increase. Panel B of the table also shows positive and significant effects using the duration of 
time in the RSE as the dependent variable. 
 
 The fixed effects results also give large point estimates, although smaller in magnitude 
than the difference-in-difference estimates, and less significant. Nonetheless, the results on 
the PS-1 and PS-2 screened samples still show significant increases in both logs and levels of 
per capita income and consumption when using the duration in the RSE, and significant 
impacts on per-capita income and log per capita consumption using the measure of ever in 
the RSE. One potential reason for the smaller coefficients with fixed effects is attenuation 
bias due to measurement error. The Vanuatu data is considerably noisier than the Tongan 
data. For example, the baseline coefficient of variation of per capita income for the RSE 
households is 0.90 in Tonga compared to 1.40 in Vanuatu, while the correlation in per capita 
income from one wave to the next for the non-RSE households varies from 0.43 to 0.77 in 
Tonga, compared to between 0.19 and 0.27 in Vanuatu. There is thus more signal relative to 
noise in the Tongan data than in the Vanuatu data.  
 
 A final point to note on Tables 2 and 3 is that the estimates are reasonably robust to the 
choice of sample, with the estimated effects not changing dramatically as one moves from the 
full sample to the PS-1 and PS-2 screened samples. Given this robustness to different control 
samples and to controlling for individual fixed effects, and given the large magnitudes of the 
effects estimated, we believe these estimates of the causal effect of the RSE are convincing 
and unlikely to be driven by unobserved self-selection. 
 
 The median after-tax income earned in New Zealand reported by the seasonal migrants is 
approximately NZ$12,000.13 This is several multiples of the mean annual household income 
per capita of RSE households at baseline, which was approximately NZ$1400 in Tonga and 
NZ$2500 in Vanuatu. Despite the large increase in income from the RSE, one might then ask 
why the increase in per capita incomes is “only” 35 percent. First, workers face costs in New 
Zealand, both from living expenses (including rent and health insurance) and from repayment 
of their share of the airfare. Out of the NZ$12,000 in income, the average worker remitted or 
brought back with them an average of NZ$5,500. This amount was similar in Tonga and 
Vanuatu, the difference being that in Tonga about half was in the form of remittances and 
half as repatriated savings, whereas in Vanuatu only 10 percent was in the form of 
remittances and 90 percent as repatriated savings. Second, when we consider per capita 
income, this amount is divided by 5.7 in Tonga and 4.7 in Vanuatu. Third, we are looking at 
average impacts over 2 years, so since just over half the households sent a worker in one year 
only, the per capita per year effect for these households has to be divided by two. Finally, 
households also lose both the wage income and contribution to agricultural production the 
                                                 
13  This number accords well with what migrants should have been earning given prevailing wage 
rates in the sector. 
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household member would have contributed while in New Zealand.  Nevertheless, this gain in 
income is still massive compared to other popular development interventions – it compares to 
a 8 percent gain in per capita consumption from Progresa/Oportunidades (Fiszbein and 
Schady, 2009) and to no average increase in per capita consumption from a microfinance 
intervention (Banerjee et al, 2010). 
 
4.2 Impact on Subjective Well-being 
 
In addition to measuring household welfare through income and expenditure, our final round 
survey measured subjective well-being. Households were asked to imagine a 10-step ladder, 
where on the bottom step were the poorest people and the top step the richest people, and to 
state which step of the ladder they thought their household was on today, and on which step 
their household was on two years ago. Ravallion and Lokshin (2001) refer to this as an 
economic ladder question, and note that it leaves it up to the individual to define what 
constitutes “poor” or not, and captures subjective economic welfare.  
 
 We estimate equation (3) without including baseline subjective wellbeing as a control 
since it is only measured ex post. The results are shown in the first row of Table 4.14 In 
Tonga, participating in the RSE is estimated to increase subjective welfare by 0.43 steps on 
the ladder, about 45 percent of a standard deviation. This effect is strongly significant. 
Adding the household’s recalled subjective well-being from two years earlier only slightly 
reduces this coefficient, to 0.36 for the PS-2 screened group, and is still strongly significant 
(p<0.001). Participating in the RSE is estimated to increase subjective welfare by 0.71-0.83 
steps on the ladder in Vanuatu, which is 43-50 percent of a standard deviation and strongly 
significant. Adding the household’s recalled subjective well-being from two years earlier 
does not change these results, yielding coefficients in the 0.74-0.85 range, with again strong 
significance (p<0.001). Subjective economic welfare has therefore increased in both countries 
for households participating in the RSE. Moreover, the increase in subjective welfare is of 
similar magnitude in terms of standard deviation improvements as the increases in income: 
the estimated impacts on per capita income in tables 2 and 3 translate to a 0.24-0.43 standard 
deviation increase in per capita income in Tonga, and 0.31-0.47 standard deviation increase 
in per capita income in Vanuatu. 
 
4.3 Impact on Dwelling Improvements and Durable Assets 
 
Home improvement was the third most commonly mentioned use of the money Tongan RSE 
households earned through the RSE (after meeting family needs and paying for school fees). 
The second row of Table 4 shows that Tongan households participating in the RSE were 10 
to 11 percentage points more likely to have made a dwelling improvement over the two years 
of our surveys. This represents an almost doubling of the percentage of non-RSE households 
                                                 
14  Table 4 just shows the PS-1 and PS-2 screened results for reasons of space. The results using the 
full sample are similar both in terms of magnitudes and statistical significance. 
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which made dwelling improvements over the same period (12 percent). Home improvements 
were the most commonly mentioned main use of money from the RSE in Vanuatu, with 
participants saying that they were using money earned to do things such as build a new 
house, install a solar panel, add an iron roof, or renovate their house. However, although the 
point estimates suggest that RSE households were 7-8 percentage points more likely to make 
a dwelling improvement, this effect is only marginally significant when using the binary 
categorization of RSE status. We do see a significant positive effect using duration in RSE. 
Dwelling improvements are reported to be much more commonplace in Vanuatu than in our 
Tongan survey, with 79 percent of non-RSE households making a dwelling improvement 
over the two years of our surveys.15 The impact of the RSE may also then be for households 
to make more substantive improvements, such as the transition from traditional to modern 
dwellings, which our surveys don’t directly capture since dwelling type was only recorded at 
baseline. 
 
 In the baseline survey, 65 percent of Tongan RSE households reported having a bank 
account. By the fourth round this had increased to 83 percent. Row 4 of Table 4 shows this 
represents a statistically significant 10-14 percentage point increase relative to non-RSE 
households over the two year period. This increase in bank account usage likely reflects bank 
accounts being set up for the purpose of household savings, rather than bank accounts 
directly being used to receive remittances. For the Tongan sample, over 90 percent of 
remittances were made via Melei mei Langi (a Tongan-run money transfer operator) or 
Western Union, and only 1 household in our sample directly transferred money through a 
bank. In Vanuatu we find the share of RSE households with a bank account increasing from 
55 percent in the baseline to 74 percent for the same households two years later. This is 
estimated to be a statistically significant 17-18 percentage point increase relative to the non-
RSE households over the same period. Although 22 percent of ni-Vanuatu RSE households 
receiving remittances received them through a bank transfer (Western Union was the main 
source of transfers), this effect of the RSE on bank account usage continues to hold even if 
we control for whether the household received a bank transfer remittance. Therefore, as in 
Tonga, it is likely that this increase in household bank account usage reflects the use of banks 
for savings, rather than just to receive remittances.  
 
 The remainder of Table 4 considers durable asset ownership. Each follow-up round 
asked households if they had made any major purchase of assets since the last survey, defined 
as valued at 200 pa’anga or more in Tonga or 10,000 vatu or more in Vanuatu. Row 3 of 
Table 4 shows that Tongan RSE households were 12-15 percentage points more likely to 
have made such a purchase, which is again double the rate of non-RSE households. Ni-
Vanuatu RSE households were 27-30 percent more likely to have made such a purchase, 
                                                 
15  This reflects the much higher proportion of households living in traditional (bush material) 
dwellings in Vanuatu, which have short life expectancy compared with modern dwellings.   
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which more than doubles the 20 percent of non-RSE households making such a purchase. In 
both countries the impact is statistically significant. 
 
 In addition to households purchasing assets, RSE workers sometimes returned with 
durable goods acquired abroad. DVD players were the most common such asset. Each round 
of the survey also directly asked about ownership of certain durable goods, enabling us to 
capture the net effect of purchases, sales, and durable goods that migrants bought back with 
them. The Tongan RSE households are significantly more likely to have acquired a 
cellphone, television, DVD player, and bicycle over the two-year period than similar non-
RSE households. RSE households also seem to have sold their kerosene ovens and purchased 
gas or electric ovens instead. The ni-Vanuatu RSE households are significantly more likely to 
have acquired a radio or stereo, a DVD player, a computer, a gas or electric oven and a boat 
over the two-year period than similar non-RSE households. We do not see any significant 
impact on livestock ownership in either country. 
 
4.4 Impact on Children’s Education and Business Ownership 
 
In addition to raising household incomes and assets, an important motivation for many 
households to participate in the RSE was the chance to raise money to pay for school fees. In 
our baseline survey 85 percent of Tongan RSE households and 98 percent of ni-Vanuatu RSE 
households said that earning money to pay for school fees was a very important or somewhat 
important motive for participating in the RSE. In addition, school fees are one of the most 
common special purposes that households report using remittance income from RSE workers 
for in our surveys, and when households were asked in the final round survey what the most 
important use of the money earned in the RSE has been, 40% of Tongans and 28% of ni-
Vanuatu said school expenses. The question is then whether this translates into higher 
schooling attainment for children. 
 
 Table 5 shows the impact of being in an RSE household on school attendance in the final 
round survey, conditional on baseline school attendance status and age (equation 3). In 
Tonga, schooling is compulsory between ages 6 and 15, and there is near universal school 
enrolment for children of these ages. It is therefore no surprise that we see no impact of the 
RSE on children who were aged 6 to 14 at baseline since over 97 percent of children of this 
age are attending school whether or not their household is in the RSE. In contrast, the last 
three columns of panel A show large positive effects of the RSE on school attendance of 
children aged 15 to 18 years at baseline. These effects are statistically significant for the full 
sample and PS-1 samples, and of similar magnitude but not significant in the smaller PS-2 
sample. The magnitude of the effect is sizeable – a 10 to 14 percentage point increase in the 
proportion attending school, relative to 60 percent of children in non-RSE households 
attending school on average over this two year period. 
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 In contrast, panel B shows no significant effect of the RSE on school attendance in 
Vanuatu. One reason may be that starting in 2010, when the final round survey was in the 
field, primary schooling became fully subsidized whereas previous fees were 7000 vatu per 
year (10 percent of per capita average income). Moreover, many schools had allowed 
students to remain enrolled even with unpaid fees from previous years; the main incentive to 
clearing these debts was that it allowed students to sit the leaving examinations at the end of 
Grade 6 and 8. Hence, RSE workers reporting the payment of school fees as a motivation 
may have repaying school fee debts, which would not show up in current enrolment except 
for a possibly higher transition rate to high school (which also depends on examination 
performance). Our data do not capture this higher transition rate, partly because rural students 
often leave their households to live with urban relatives so as to attend secondary school 
(national secondary enrolment rates are below 40 percent and are much lower in rural areas, 
in part because of geographic inaccessibly of schools). 
 
 The apparently divergent impacts of RSE participation on school enrolment also may 
reflect the nature of the selection into the RSE in the two countries. In Vanuatu, the 
households participating in the RSE are relatively better off, and their children have higher 
baseline school attendance rates than non-RSE households. It is therefore possible that credit 
constraints were not limiting schooling for this group. In contrast, the Tongan RSE 
households were relatively poorer at baseline than the non-RSE households, and had lower 
school attendance rates. The extra income earned through the RSE allows them to then catch-
up to (and surpass) the school attendance rates of the non-RSE group. 
 
 Our data do not show any evidence that the RSE has fostered the development of non-
agricultural businesses among the households in our sample in Tonga. None of the 
households surveyed mentioned investment in a business as a main use of the money earned 
in the RSE, and we do not observe any individuals in RSE households starting a new business 
over the two year period of our surveys. In Vanuatu we only had 5 households in the round 4 
survey say the most important use of the money earned through the RSE was starting a 
business or supporting an existing business. Given the low population densities and small 
local markets, it is not clear what the scope for such business start-ups actually is, but over 
the first two years of the RSE policy, there does not appear to be much evidence of it 
fostering self-employment. 
 
4. Community-level Impacts  
 
Finally we consider the broader impacts of the RSE on the sending communities. The most 
direct impact is through the monetary contribution that migrants make to their communities, 
either through remitting to a community group while abroad or contributing some of their 
repatriated earnings to this group upon return. We asked return migrants how much they had 
contributed in this way to the community. The mean response aggregated over the two years 
was 157 pa’anga in Tonga and 11733 vatu in Vanuatu – or approximately US$80-130 per 
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migrant. Our expenditure module also collected expenditure on community obligations, but 
only for a recall period of one month, thereby likely missing one-off contributions made by 
migrants upon return. The difference-in-differences regression then gives a positive, but 
insignificant impact on this item. 
 
 To further gauge the impacts at the community level, we conducted surveys of 
community leaders. This was done at baseline and at the time of the second round survey in 
Vanuatu, and at baseline and at the times of the third and fourth round surveys in Tonga. 
These data are thus less useful for Vanuatu, since they only measure immediate effects while 
most workers were still away. The Tongan surveys reveal the mean (median) community 
saying it received 633 (500) pa’anga from RSE workers, which is consistent with the 
community surveys giving a median of 5 workers per village participating coupled with the 
amounts reported by workers. The main use of this fund in 83% of cases in Tonga was 
funding the village water supply in the first year. In the second year, villages were also using 
this for street lighting, a school scholarship fund, community halls, and in one case, adding 
internet to a community hall.  
 
 Village leaders were directly asked the main benefit and main disadvantages of the RSE 
for their community. In Vanuatu this was only asked in wave 2, 6 months into the RSE. The 
main benefits reported at this stage were job opportunities for people in the village, money to 
support the village church, and improvements in housing. Disadvantages were less people to 
do the community work, cases where a worker is not contributing to church or family, and 
concerns about the potential bad influence of alcohol abroad. In Tonga these questions were 
asked in waves 3 and 4, approximately one year and two years into the RSE. The main 
benefit reported at one year is income for families, along with some saying income for the 
community and church donations. After two years, there are also a few mentions of improved 
skills and improved English in the workers, and positive impacts on school enrolments. When 
asked the main disadvantage, at one year, more than half say none, the main other answer 
being family separation. At two years, one-third say family separation, 30 percent say less 
labor for village, church, and community projects, about 15 percent say fewer members for 
church activities. 
 
 Table 6 then summarizes the results of questions in both the household and community 
leader surveys intended to measure qualitatively the impressions of the broader community-
level impacts of the RSE. The RSE workers themselves believe that participation in the RSE 
either improved or left unchanged their family and community life. Non-RSE households in 
Tonga also see benefits in terms of community life, availability of paid jobs, and schooling 
opportunities. To the extent that such benefits are really accruing to non-RSE households, our 
estimates comparing RSE to non-RSE households will be a lower bound on the positive 
development impact of the RSE program. Non-RSE households in Vanuatu are more likely 
than those in Tonga to say there has been no change in community life or in job or schooling 
opportunities. Finally, the bottom of the table summarizes the results of asking community 
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leaders their assessment of the overall impact of the RSE on their communities. In Tonga 92 
percent of leaders say that it has had positive effects after two years, and in Vanuatu, even at 
6 months, 72 percent of leaders say the overall impact is positive. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
New Zealand’s Recognised Seasonal Employer program was designed with promoting 
development in the Pacific Islands as an explicit goal. The results of our multi-year 
prospective impact evaluation show that it has largely achieved this goal. Participating in the 
RSE has raised incomes in both Tonga and Vanuatu, allowed households to accumulate more 
assets, increased subjective standards of living, and, additionally in Tonga improved child 
school attendance for older children. Communities also seem to have received modest 
benefits in terms of monetary contributions from workers, with community leaders 
overwhelmingly viewing the policy as having an overall positive impact. 
 
 These results make this seasonal migration program one of the most effective 
development interventions for which rigorous evaluations are available. In addition, although 
there has been non-trivial investment by both the New Zealand and Pacific Governments in 
setting up and facilitating this policy, it does not involve grants, and appears to be benefiting 
both the private employers and the workers. The design features of the program and the low 
rate of overstaying have already led to this policy being heralded as international best 
practice. The large development impacts seen here should further foster the case for other 
countries to consider similar policies. 
 
 Nevertheless, there are several caveats to these conclusions. The first is that development 
is a long-term process, and some of the effects of the RSE may only materialize over many 
years of community involvement. These could include positive effects such as greater asset-
building, investments and skill development if workers return for many seasons, as well as 
potential longer-term negative effects of continual absence of family members on family and 
community relations. Secondly, while the gains to households from this seasonal migration 
are large, they still pale in comparison to the gains from permanent international migration 
(McKenzie et al, 2010). A key policy issue is therefore the extent to which seasonal 
migration can or cannot eventually open up avenues for permanent migration.  Finally, as 
with all evaluations, there is the question of how far the policy details and findings can be 
extrapolated to other settings. The fact that New Zealand’s program is sizeable by 
international standards (greatly exceeding Australia’s fledging seasonal worker pilot and 
about one-third the size of Canada’s SWAP program for example) and that it was developed 
drawing on lessons from experiences around the world should provide some external validity. 
As temporary migration programs are increasingly emphasized in policy discussions, there is 
likely to be plenty of scope for Governments and researchers to work together in the future in 
assessing how well these lessons translate. 
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Appendix: Robustness to Attrition in the Vanuatu sample 
 
There was almost no attrition in the Tongan sample. In contrast, 16.7 percent of the PS-2 
screened Vanuatu sample had attrited by the final wave. The attrition rate was slightly higher 
for the non-RSE households (19.3 percent) than for the RSE households (13.7 percent), 
although this difference is not significant. Attrition is significantly associated with lower 
baseline asset levels and lower baseline per capita income. This is consistent with the 
observations from the field, whereby some poor non-RSE households told our enumerators 
that their lives had not changed at all, so that they refused to answer the same questions again 
and again.  
 
 Given our estimation is based on difference-in-differences, attrition will only bias our 
results if it is associated with changes in outcomes, not levels.  A first test of this is to see 
whether the change in income between rounds 1 and 2 is associated with whether or not the 
household then appears in the final wave (round 4).  A probit examining this finds no 
significant relationship (p=0.64). A second approach is to construct Lee (2009) bounds on the 
size of the treatment effect. The key identifying assumption for implementing these bounds is 
a monotonicity assumption that participation in the RSE affects sample selection only in one 
direction. Since non-RSE households are more likely to attrit, this amounts to assuming that 
no household who attrits when in the RSE would have not attrited had they not participated in 
the RSE. This appears reasonable to a first-order, although may be violated for the small 
number of households in which divorce occurred.  
 
 We then construct a lower bound for the RSE treatment effect by trimming out the top 7 
percent of RSE households in terms of changes in per capita income between round 1 and 
round 4. This would be the treatment effect under the unlikely scenario that it was the non-
RSE households who experienced large positive income shocks who decided to attrit. Using 
the PS-2 screened sample, we get difference-in-differences point estimates of 27,822 vatu 
(p=0.02) for the effect on per capita income, and 0.301 (p=0.01) for the effect on log per 
capita income. An upper bound can likewise be formed by eliminating the 7 percent of RSE 
households with the smallest (most negative) income change between round 1 and round 4. 
Doing this yields a 53,354 vatu (p=0.001) effect for per capita income and 0.399 (p=0.001) 
effect for log per capita income. These bounds are thus quite tight, and show that the large 
increase in income in Vanuatu from the RSE is robust to attrition. 
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Table 1: Means of Baseline Characteristics of Households
RSE All Non‐RSE PS‐1 in PS‐2 in RSE All Non‐RSE PS‐1 in PS‐2 in
Households Households [0.1, 0.9] [0.1, 0.9] Households Households [0.1, 0.9] [0.1, 0.9]
Household Size 5.70 4.82*** 5.08** 5.05 4.72 4.83 4.68 4.71
Number of Males 18 to 50 1.50 1.25*** 1.34* 1.37 1.25 1.21 1.23 1.17
Share of Male 18 to 50s that:
   Are Literate in English 0.92 0.85** 0.90 0.89 0.85 0.70*** 0.79 0.75**
  Have more than 10 Years Schooling 0.46 0.49 0.52 0.52 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.05
  Have very good self‐reported health 0.68 0.60* 0.63 0.59 0.83 0.69*** 0.77 0.70***
  Drank alcohol in last month 0.42 0.39 0.42 0.46 0.52 0.55 0.56 0.53
Mean days hard labor in past week males 18 to 50 4.56 3.97*** 4.19* 4.04 3.05 3.38 3.37 3.35
Share of Adults who previously have worked or studied in NZ 0.38 0.20*** 0.23*** 0.21*** 0.08 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.00***
Number of Relatives in NZ 5.41 4.80* 4.87 4.64 0.10 0.06 0.03* 0.05
Household Durable Assets Index 0.07 ‐0.06 0.01 ‐0.15 0.60 ‐0.29*** ‐0.12*** ‐0.48**
Number of Pigs 5.57 5.49 5.40 5.12 3.82 3.42 3.62 3.37
Number of Chickens 5.11 5.12 5.12 4.69 9.99 12.75* 11.72 11.73
Number of Cattle 0.45 0.47 0.42 0.44 1.39 1.73 1.72 1.32
Have a traditional‐style Dwelling 0.15 0.13 0.10 0.14 0.70 0.75 0.75 0.78
Located on Tongatapu or Efate 0.81 0.80 0.83 0.83 0.46 0.33** 0.38 0.33
Semi‐annual per capita income (pa'anga or vatu) 979 1342*** 1142 1103 85282 71961 69805 72442
Semi‐annual per capita consumption (pa'anga or vatu) 829 1184*** 948* 978 65872 55462* 58953 60909
Proportion with income per capita below US$1 per day 0.19 0.12** 0.14 0.17 0.19 0.21 0.20 0.20
Proportion with income per capita below US$2 per day 0.49 0.36*** 0.41 0.44 0.37 0.44 0.43 0.45
Had a male aged 18 to 50 work for pay in early 2007 0.21 0.27 0.26 0.25 0.41 0.35 0.34 0.28**
Sample Size 197 251 196 121 147 309 231 146
Notes: *, **, and *** indicate that differs in mean from the RSE households at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.
PS‐1 and PS‐2 are the two propensity‐score matched groups. See text for details.
For the PS‐1 and PS‐2 comparisons, this test of difference in means compares to the RSE households which also have propensity score 
in the [0.1, 0.9] range.
Non‐RSE with
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Table 2: Average Impact of RSE Migration on Household Income and Expenditure in Tonga
Baseline Mean (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Outcome Variable: for RSE households All PS‐1 PS‐2 PS‐2‐Trim All PS‐1 PS‐2 PS‐2‐Trim
PANEL A: IMPACT OF EVER BEING IN THE RSE
Per Capita Income 979 331.0*** 278.4*** 233.1* 325.3*** 347.4*** 271.0*** 248.7** 300.1***
(99.30) (105.3) (129.5) (90.92) (87.50) (87.78) (106.2) (80.56)
Log per Capita Income  6.57 0.355*** 0.346*** 0.290*** 0.331*** 0.383*** 0.355*** 0.324*** 0.350***
(0.0708) (0.0767) (0.0935) (0.0865) (0.0656) (0.0697) (0.0840) (0.0802)
Per Capita Expenditure 829 224.1** 127.1 104.6 142.4** 249.8** 117.8* 133.0 145.0**
(111.6) (81.77) (104.1) (63.13) (111.5) (65.56) (82.17) (61.70)
Log per Capita Expenditure 6.58 0.124** 0.117** 0.0834 0.106* 0.128*** 0.0926* 0.0900 0.103*
(0.0520) (0.0538) (0.0662) (0.0584) (0.0481) (0.0506) (0.0595) (0.0560)
PANEL B: IMPACT PER MONTH'S DURATION IN RSE
Per Capita Income 979 24.56*** 23.49** 20.03* 27.45*** 39.48*** 35.06*** 31.19*** 33.94***
(8.771) (9.723) (11.34) (10.03) (8.405) (8.562) (10.11) (9.689)
Log per Capita Income  6.57 0.0326*** 0.0350*** 0.0329*** 0.0360*** 0.0459*** 0.0469*** 0.0449*** 0.0462***
(0.00697) (0.00780) (0.00895) (0.00875) (0.00729) (0.00743) (0.00878) (0.00875)
Per Capita Expenditure 829 9.765 3.476 ‐0.126 3.722 15.78 2.632 1.170 2.194
(8.638) (7.625) (9.458) (8.195) (9.848) (6.120) (7.147) (6.763)
Log per Capita Expenditure 6.58 0.00257 0.00227 ‐0.00178 0.000140 0.00339 ‐0.00106 ‐0.00277 ‐0.00217
(0.00583) (0.00685) (0.00820) (0.00803) (0.00504) (0.00571) (0.00626) (0.00624)
Number of Observations 1,774 1,499 1,092 1,080 1,774 1,499 1,092 1,080
Number of Households 448 379 274 274 448 379 274 274
Notes: All outcomes are converted to 6 month values.
The Subsamples used are i) All: the full sample; ii) PS‐1, the propensity‐score screened subsample; iii) PS‐2, the propensity‐score screened
subsample restricted to RSE applicant households only; and iv) PS‐2 after trimming observations above the 99th percentile for the full sample.
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the household level, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Difference‐in‐Differences Fixed Effects
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Table 3: Average Impact of RSE Migration on Household Income and Expenditure in Vanuatu
Baseline Mean (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Outcome Variable: for RSE households All PS‐1 PS‐2 PS‐2‐Trim All PS‐1 PS‐2 PS‐2‐Trim
PANEL A: IMPACT OF EVER BEING IN THE RSE
Per Capita Income 85282 42,861*** 44,441*** 48,241*** 24,491*** 29,522* 32,760** 37,717** 17,489*
(15,201) (15,659) (16,388) (8,291) (15,585) (14,938) (15,389) (9,400)
Log per Capita Income  10.73 0.320*** 0.301*** 0.364*** 0.310*** 0.186* 0.167 0.267** 0.227*
(0.104) (0.107) (0.116) (0.115) (0.109) (0.109) (0.121) (0.120)
Per Capita Expenditure 65872 8,495 12,353** 13,020** 9,289* 1,093 2,228 2,978 1,213
(6,590) (6,131) (5,559) (5,195) (5,761) (6,217) (5,912) (5,777)
Log per Capita Expenditure 10.63 0.240*** 0.261*** 0.254*** 0.227*** 0.134* 0.137* 0.132* 0.125
(0.0745) (0.0778) (0.0761) (0.0766) (0.0746) (0.0806) (0.0799) (0.0805)
PANEL B: IMPACT PER MONTH'S DURATION IN RSE
Per Capita Income 85282 3,382* 4,992** 5,219** 2,273** 3,391 5,066** 5,964** 2,694**
(1,862) (2,102) (2,109) (1,119) (2,307) (2,572) (2,615) (1,080)
Log per Capita Income  10.73 0.0366*** 0.0466*** 0.0501*** 0.0432*** 0.0284** 0.0364*** 0.0488*** 0.0431***
(0.0133) (0.0148) (0.0150) (0.0147) (0.0126) (0.0135) (0.0140) (0.0137)
Per Capita Expenditure 65872 1,006 2,225** 2,023** 1,574** 660.3 1,531** 1,504** 1,194*
(936.8) (865.7) (825.3) (782.7) (740.4) (766.1) (734.7) (694.1)
Log per Capita Expenditure 10.63 0.0233** 0.0351*** 0.0321*** 0.0284** 0.0162* 0.0258** 0.0236** 0.0222**
(0.0105) (0.0114) (0.0115) (0.0114) (0.00942) (0.0101) (0.00991) (0.00993)
Number of Observations 1,574 1,225 977 967 1,574 1,225 977 967
Number of Households 456 360 269 269 456 360 269 269
Notes: All outcomes are converted to 6 month values.
The Subsamples used are i) All: the full sample; ii) PS‐1, the propensity‐score screened subsample; iii) PS‐2, the propensity‐score screened
subsample restricted to RSE applicant households only; and iv) PS‐2 after trimming observations above the 99th percentile for the full sample.
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the household level, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Difference‐in‐Differences Fixed Effects
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Table 4: Impact of RSE participation on household assets and Subjective Standard of Living 2 years later
Asset PS‐1 PS‐2 PS‐1 PS‐2 PS‐1 PS‐2 PS‐1 PS‐2
Subjective Standard of Living 0.431*** 0.427*** 0.0574*** 0.0590*** 0.825*** 0.712*** 0.0807*** 0.0672***
(0.0940) (0.114) (0.0106) (0.0127) (0.198) (0.194) (0.0199) (0.0190)
Made any dwelling improvement 0.106*** 0.108** 0.0225*** 0.0243*** 0.0749 0.0839* 0.00969** 0.0109**
(0.0391) (0.0450) (0.00480) (0.00554) (0.0458) (0.0492) (0.00412) (0.00427)
Household Bank Account 0.0956** 0.140*** 0.0100*** 0.0137*** 0.180*** 0.168*** 0.0135** 0.0119**
(0.0373) (0.0462) (0.00377) (0.00459) (0.0562) (0.0608) (0.00578) (0.00602)
Made any major asset purchase 0.163*** 0.113** 0.0148*** 0.00913 0.299*** 0.268*** 0.0318*** 0.0269***
(0.0426) (0.0521) (0.00492) (0.00588) (0.0593) (0.0629) (0.00645) (0.00677)
Pigs ‐0.202 ‐0.193 ‐0.00378 ‐0.0184 ‐1.031 ‐0.0802 ‐0.0809 ‐0.0240
(0.225) (0.303) (0.0260) (0.0327) (0.715) (0.443) (0.0564) (0.0407)
Cattle 0.0354 0.0407 0.00288 ‐0.00167 0.199 0.416 0.0516 0.0697
(0.0654) (0.0891) (0.00670) (0.00813) (0.506) (0.496) (0.0613) (0.0605)
Chickens ‐0.164 ‐0.169 ‐0.0351 ‐0.0360 ‐7.203 ‐0.225 ‐0.629 ‐0.0171
(0.262) (0.318) (0.0275) (0.0329) (5.960) (1.381) (0.532) (0.141)
Cellphone 0.0563* 0.0611 0.00904** 0.0110** ‐0.0284 ‐0.0374 0.00214 0.00165
(0.0334) (0.0435) (0.00367) (0.00454) (0.0450) (0.0469) (0.00363) (0.00367)
Radios/Stereos 0.0445* 0.0275 0.00501** 0.00386 0.288*** 0.261*** 0.0293*** 0.0272***
(0.0229) (0.0282) (0.00230) (0.00265) (0.0601) (0.0651) (0.00610) (0.00642)
Television Sets 0.0794*** 0.0736** 0.00965***0.00883*** 0.0320 ‐0.0214 0.00122 ‐0.00322
(0.0273) (0.0349) (0.00249) (0.00295) (0.0498) (0.0534) (0.00510) (0.00530)
DVD Player 0.0543 0.0740* 0.00286 0.00297 0.190*** 0.235*** 0.0194*** 0.0252***
(0.0349) (0.0423) (0.00364) (0.00435) (0.0591) (0.0643) (0.00638) (0.00679)
Computer 0.000151 ‐0.00176 0.000125 ‐0.000207 0.0666* 0.0623* 0.0123*** 0.0115**
(0.0110) (0.0141) (0.000929) (0.00116) (0.0340) (0.0327) (0.00466) (0.00458)
Gas or electric oven 0.0868** 0.117** 0.00815** 0.00982** 0.102** 0.125*** 0.00881* 0.00941**
(0.0374) (0.0461) (0.00378) (0.00448) (0.0451) (0.0432) (0.00482) (0.00460)
Kerosene Cooker ‐0.0804***‐0.0946***‐0.00612** ‐0.00679* 0.0345 ‐0.000831 0.00277 0.000248
(0.0274) (0.0363) (0.00311) (0.00375) (0.0242) (0.0197) (0.00245) (0.00223)
Boats  0.0018 0.000 0.0002 (0.000) 0.111** 0.0827* 0.0137*** 0.0113**
(0.0022) (0.000) (0.0003) (0.000) (0.0447) (0.0466) (0.00514) (0.00517)
Bicycles 0.0686* 0.0853* 0.00482 0.00595 0.0511 0.0381 0.00666 0.00532
(0.0362) (0.0473) (0.00389) (0.00484) (0.0394) (0.0400) (0.00451) (0.00452)
Cars or Pick‐up trucks 0.0524 0.0767 0.00312 0.00352 0.0188 0.00625 0.00151 0.000566
(0.0408) (0.0496) (0.00449) (0.00551) (0.0223) (0.0223) (0.00210) (0.00203)
Number of Households 372 271 372 271 268 224 268 224
Notes:
All asset regressions and bank account regression control for baseline asset levels
Robust standard errors shown in parentheses
Ever in RSE Duration
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Table 5: Impact of the RSE on Children's School Attendance in Final Round survey
Full Full
Sample PS‐1 PS‐2 Sample PS‐1 PS‐2
Panel A: Tongan Children 
Household is ever in the RSE ‐0.004 ‐0.004 ‐0.005 0.129** 0.136** 0.094
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.059) (0.063) (0.083)
Number of Months in the RSE ‐0.001 ‐0.001 ‐0.002 0.010 0.017** 0.013
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.006) (0.007) (0.009)
Number of Observations 478 414 286 167 144 97
Proportion of non‐RSE students attending school 0.983 0.984 0.977 0.603 0.599 0.576
Panel B: ni‐Vanuatu Children 
Household is ever in the RSE ‐0.022 ‐0.053 ‐0.033 ‐0.032 0.022 0.013
(0.048) (0.056) (0.063) (0.107) (0.123) (0.127)
Number of Months in the RSE ‐0.002 ‐0.005 ‐0.002 ‐0.007 ‐0.003 ‐0.006
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011)
Number of Observations 344 261 219 101 71 60
Proportion of non‐RSE students attending school 0.813 0.816 0.790 0.384 0.397 0.370
Notes:
Results show regression coefficients after controlling for baseline school attendance and age
Robust standard errors in parentheses,  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Aged 6 to 14 at Baseline Aged 15 to 18 at Baseline
 
 
Table 6: Qualitative impressions of the broader impacts of the RSE 
Better No change Worse Better No change Worse
Opinions of RSE workers
Percent who think involvement in RSE:
   Made Family Life (at 1 year) 81.8 11.9 6.3 48.6 50.0 1.4
   Made Community Life (at 1 year) 83.0 15.9 1.1 27.1 70.0 2.9
Opinions of non‐RSE households in these communities
Percent who think involvement of community members in RSE has:
   Made Community Life (at 6 months) 49.4 46.7 3.8 16.1 67.4 18.5
   Made Community Life (at 2 years) 10.6 88.2 1.2 14.6 77.7 7.7
   Made availability of paid jobs (at 6 months) 38.7 49.0 12.3 13.2 67.0 19.8
   Made availability of paid jobs (at 2 years) 39.4 60.2 0.4 7.0 72.9 20.2
   Made schooling opportunities for children in the community (at 6 months) 18.4 77.0 4.6 27.2 64.1 8.7
   Made schooling opportunities for children in the community (at 2 years) 52.9 47.2 0.0 12.4 72.9 14.7
Opinions of Community Leaders
Percent who think involvement of community members in RSE has:
  Made Community Life (at 1 year Tonga/6 months Vanuatu) 3.0 97.0 0.0 32.6 41.8 25.4
  Made Community Life (at 2 years) 68.0 25.3 6.7
  Made availability of paid jobs (at 1 year Tonga/6 months Vanuatu) 2.0 98.0 0.0 29.1 70.9 0.0
  Made availability of paid jobs (at 2 years) 89.3 10.7 0.0
  Made schooling opportunities for children in the community (at 1 year Tonga/6 months Vanuatu) 10.0 90.0 0.0 24.1 74.1 1.9
  Made schooling opportunities for children in the community (at 2 years) 69.3 26.7 4.0
Positive No effect Negative Positive No effect Negative
Community leader perception of overall impact for the community (at 6 months) 72.2 13.0 14.8
Community leader perception of overall impact for the community (at 1 year) 98.3 0.0 1.7
Community leader perception of overall impact for the community (at 2 years) 92.0 2.7 5.3
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